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A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO OBSERVE
ELECTIONS: FULFILLING THE DREAM OF
RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS BY EXTENDING IT TO
THE POLLING PLACE
Andrew D. Howell+
The First Amendment not only protects the right to speak, but also the right
to gather information.1 When evaluating whether the public has a presumptive
constitutional right to access a government process, either by itself or via the
press, courts use the “experience and logic” test first described in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.2 This test, which has been further developed since
Richmond Newspapers was decided, determined a presumptive First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials, and has subsequently been applied
by lower courts in civil trials and administrative proceedings.3
The Third and Sixth Circuits, however, disagree as to whether certain
administrative proceedings pass the “experience and logic” test, and whether the
press has a presumptive right of access to the polling place.4 In 2004, the Sixth
Circuit held that the press has a presumptive right of access to the polling place,
although it is not clear whether the Sixth Circuit fully engaged the “experience
and logic” test.5 However, in 2013, the Third Circuit held that the press does
not have a right of access to the polling place, finding the “experience and logic”
test unsatisfied.6 By examining the history of access to the polling place as well

+
J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A.,
2009, The College of William and Mary. The author extends his deep gratitude to Professor
William Wagner for his insightful comments and guidance during the drafting of this Comment, as
well as Professor Wagner’s excellent instruction in constitutional law. The author also expresses
his thanks and appreciation to his family and friends who have encouraged him during all of his
law school endeavors, including the drafting of this Comment. Finally, the author extends his
sincere thanks to the staff members of the Catholic University Law Review for their patience and
meticulous work during the writing and editing process of this Comment.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see infra Part I.A–B.
2. 448 U.S. 555 (1980); see infra Part I.C.
3. See infra Part I.C.
4. Compare PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming the
constitutionality of a state statute restricting the media’s access to the polling place), and N. Jersey
Media Grp. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 221 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that there is no First Amendment
right of access to deportation proceedings), with Beacon Journal Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Blackwell, 389
F.3d 683, 685 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming the right of access to the polling place for news gatherings
and reporting), and Detroit Free Press Corp. v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 682–83 (6th Cir. 2002)
(affirming that a blanket closure of deportation proceedings is unconstitutional).
5. See infra Part I.F.1.
6. See infra notes 135–49 and accompanying text.
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as the public interest in access, this Comment evaluates and argues that the twopart “experience and logic” test is satisfied.7
This Comment begins by providing a broad overview of certain rights and
protections afforded by the First Amendment, including the rights to speak and
gather information. Next, to determine if a qualified presumptive First
Amendment right of access to the polls exists, this Comment highlights Supreme
Court and subsequent lower court jurisprudence applying the “experience and
logic” test to governmental proceedings. This Comment then proceeds to
explain current state laws concerning access to the polling place for individuals
not specifically there to vote. Examining the already robust history of openness
of the polls to “outsiders,”8 and analogizing the public interests at stake in the
polling place with those at stake in other governmental processes, Part II of this
Comment argues that when the “experience and logic” test is applied to instances
of media access to the polling place, the test is satisfied, creating a presumptive
First Amendment right of media access to the polls. Such a presumptive right
of access does not have to ignite mayhem at the polling place that critics may
fear, as reasonable restrictions can be placed on rights of access, so long as strict
scrutiny is satisfied.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS THE RIGHT TO SPEAK AND THE RIGHT TO
GATHER INFORMATION
A. The First Amendment Protects the Right to Free Expression
The First Amendment is described by one commentator as “form[ing] the
foundation for what many consider to be defining American traits:
individualism, boundless creative expression, and the spirit of protest.”9 It
states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”10 As part of the Bill of Rights, the
First Amendment was enacted to serve as a check on the power of the new
Congress.11 The first word of this well-known amendment, notably, is
“Congress.”12 The First Amendment, similar to much of the rest of the Bill of

7. See infra Part II. Although issues of voting rights and its jurisprudence are discussed, this
Comment is not meant to serve as a comprehensive examination of these topics. See infra notes
187–208 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part II.B.1.a–c.
9. Jon G. Furlow, The Price of Free Speech, WIS. LAW. (2000), http://www.wisbar.org/
newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?volume=73&issue=6&articleid=19758.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. See Ronald K.L. Collins, The Speech & Press Clauses of the First Amendment, 29 DEL.
LAW. 8, 9 (2012) (noting the fears that gave rise to the drafting of the Bill of Rights and the First
Amendment).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Rights, is incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.13
On its face, the First Amendment, among other rights, protects the right to speak
freely.14 It, nonetheless, protects more than the rights specifically enumerated
within it.15
B. An Implicit “Right to Listen” Exists Within the First Amendment
Courts have consistently held that the First Amendment includes a freedom to
listen to and receive information.16 This right developed out of the First
Amendment because the freedom to listen to and receive information promotes
“the marketplace of ideas.”17 The “marketplace of ideas,” first described by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissent in Abrams v. United States,18
“represents one of the most powerful images of free speech, both for legal
thinkers and for laypersons.”19 Justice Brandeis later embraced this concept,
writing:
[The Founding Fathers] believed that freedom to think as you will and
to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that
13. See Collins, supra note 11, at 9–10; see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925) (holding that freedoms of speech and the press fall within fundamental liberties protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment). The Supreme Court has incorporated nearly all of the Bill of
Rights amendments against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jessica A. Roth, The
Anomaly of Entrapment, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 979, 989 (2014); see, e.g., McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (incorporating the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms
against the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and its exclusionary rule
against states).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
16. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“This right to receive information and
ideas, regardless of their social worth is fundamental to our free society.”) (citation omitted).
17. See Clay Calvert & Mirelis Torres, Staring Death in the Face During Times of War: When
Ethics, Law, and Self-Censorship in the News Media Hide the Morbidity of Authenticity, 25 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 87, 102 (2011) (citing MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE
SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 2 (2001));
Peter J. Ferrera & Carlos S. Ramirez, The Constitutional Freedom to Listen, 6 LIBERTY U.L. REV.
1, 5–6 (2011).
18. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 630 (“But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”); See Ferrera & Ramirez, supra
note 17, at 5; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L. J. 1,
2–3 (1984).
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public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government.20
Tracing back to John Stuart Mill and John Milton,21 the “marketplace of
ideas” theory of free speech provides, among other things, constitutional
limitations on the rights of public officials to sue for damages in defamation
cases22 and allows First Amendment protections for commercial speech.23 Thus,
in the same manner that the “best product” ultimately wins in the economic
marketplace, “the truth or the best policy arises out of the competition of
alternative ideas in free public debate, with the listening public free to determine
the truth out of that clash of ideas.”24 Justice Powell, overturning a state law
significantly restricting the ability of corporations to spend money promoting
political positions, summarized the idea of the so-called “marketplace of ideas,”
writing: “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the selfexpression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of
information from which members of the public may draw.”25 Essentially, the
right to speak freely fuels a parallel right to gather freely information about
which one will speak.26
C. Richmond Newspapers and Its Progeny Grant a Presumptive
Constitutional First Amendment Right of Access to Criminal Trials to the
Public and Press
1. Richmond Newspapers Puts a Constitutional Right of Access Into Action
Richmond Newspapers concerned a Virginia statute relied upon by the trial
judge that allowed a criminal trial to be closed to the public upon a defendant’s

20. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
21. See Ingber, supra note 19, at 3.
22. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1968).
The constitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Id.; see also Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967) (extending the “public
official” doctrine of New York Times v. Sullivan to “public figures”).
23. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761–65 (1976).
24. See Ferrera & Ramirez, supra note 17, at 4–5; see also Ingber, supra note 19, at 3.
This theory assumes that a process of robust debate, if uninhibited by governmental
interference, will lead to the discovery of truth, or at least the best perspectives or
solutions for societal problems. A properly functioning marketplace of ideas, in
Holmes’s perspective, ultimately assures the proper evolution of society, wherever that
evolution might lead.
Id.
25. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
26. See id.
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motion without a showing of a compelling need for closure.27 In the disputed
trial, the trial judge ordered that the press and public were to be barred from the
courtroom.28 After Richmond Newspapers, Inc. was granted the right to
intervene nunc pro tunc, it “petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court for writs of
mandamus and prohibition and filed an appeal from the trial court’s closure
order.”29 The Virginia Supreme Court denied each request, and the case was
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.30
Rejecting any suggestion of mootness,31 the Supreme Court reviewed the
history of the criminal trial in both English and American law.32 Noting the
unquestionable history of criminal trials being open to the public in both the
United States and England, from Norman feudal rule to early colonial Virginia,
the Court stressed the societal importance of maintaining open criminal trials
and concluded “that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a
criminal trial under our system of justice.”33
The Court also noted that the attendance of the public at criminal trials not
only satisfies a need for members of the public to see justice carried out fairly,
but also for a sort of “community catharsis” of emotions, especially for trials
addressing particularly heinous crimes.34 The Court, going as far as to label
media members attending criminal trials as “surrogates for the public,” indicated
that with the rise of technology in the modern world, as well as changes in
modern society, the public through the vehicle of the press often obtains news
and information about trials.35 “People in an open society,” the Court explained,
“do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to
accept what they are prohibited from observing.”36
Ultimately, the Court held that “the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in
the guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials,
which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of
speech and ‘of the press could be eviscerated.’”37 Despite establishing
presumptive openness to the public for criminal trials, the Court was careful to

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 561, 564 (1980).
Id. at 561. The jury ultimately found the defendant not guilty. Id. at 562.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 563.
See id. at 564–70.
Id. at 567–73.
See id. at 570–72.
See id. at 572–73.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
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clarify that a presumptive right of the public to attend trials (whether directly or
via the press) was not absolute.38
The public, accordingly, has what is described as a qualified First Amendment
right of access to criminal trials, relying upon a test of “logic and experience.”39
Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, articulated the inquiry necessary to inspect
the applicability of this qualified right.40 First, drawing upon the majority’s
examination of historical practices, Justice Brennan identified judicial
experience as a prong.41 Second, Justice Brennan expounded that “the value of
access must be measured in specifics,” thereby fashioning an individualized
logical prong aimed at considering the “particular government process” and its
importance as it relates to the “terms of that very process.”42 Brennan’s
concurrence, and not the plurality opinion, soon thereafter operated as the
precedential opinion.43
2. Globe Newspaper Co. Clearly Names the Richmond Newspapers
“Experience and Logic” Test
Only two years later, Justice Brennan, by definitively labeling his prior test in
his Richmond Newspapers concurrence as one of “logic and experience,”
explained the rationale for presumptive openness of criminal trials.44 In Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk,45 the Court reiterated that the
38. See id. at 581 n.18 (“[O]ur holding today does not mean that the First Amendment rights
of the public and representatives of the press are absolute. . . . [A] trial judge, in the interest of the
fair administration of justice, [may] impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial.”).
39. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 44 (1984); see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S.
at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“To resolve the case before us, therefore, we must consult
historical and current practice with respect to open trials, and weigh the importance of public access
to the trial process itself.”).
40. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
First, the case for a right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring and
vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information. Such a tradition
commands respect in part because the Constitution carries the gloss of history. More
importantly, a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience.
Second, the value of access must be measured in specifics. Analysis is not advanced by
rhetorical statements that all information bears upon public issues; what is crucial in
individual cases is whether access to a particular government process is important in
terms of that very process. To resolve the case before us, therefore, we must consult
historical and current practice with respect to open trials, and weigh the importance of
public access to the trial process itself.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Harlan Grant Cohen, The (Un)favorable Judgment of History: Deportation Hearings,
the Palmer Raids, and the Meaning of History, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1431, 1441 (2003) (noting the
Court’s movement away from a historical analysis dating back to the Norman conquests, and
instead focusing on matters exclusively after the Bill of Rights).
44. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
45. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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presumptive openness at trials, while a constitutional right, was not absolute.46
In writing for the Court, Justice Brennan made clear that when the prongs of
logic and experience are satisfied, as they are presumptively in the case of a
criminal trial,47 restrictions on the ability of the public or press to access a trial
must be evaluated under strict scrutiny.48
Ultimately, the Court held that a mandatory closure rule,49 even for the
testimony of minors who were victims of sexual abuse, could not satisfy strict
scrutiny.50 The Globe Newspaper Court mandated that speculative arguments
in support of closure, without sustaining empirical evidence, would not justify
closing a criminal proceeding.51
3. Press-Enterprise I Continues the Trend of Presumptive Openness Found
in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper
Two years after Globe Newspaper, the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court of California (Press-Enterprise I)52 evaluated a law of
presumptive closure of voir dire procedures to the public and press.53 PressEnterprise, excluded from voir dire by a law mandating presumptive closure,
sought the release of transcripts from the closed portions of the voir dire hearing,
a request denied by the trial judge.54 The Supreme Court, again stressing the
strict scrutiny standard, emphasized that there must be a case-by-case analysis
before closing criminal proceedings to the press and public.55 Such a
requirement, the Court reasoned, helps ensure the existence of a compelling
reason for closure.56
4. Press-Enterprise II Solidifies the Test of “Experience and Logic”
In 1986, Press-Enterprise, hoping to compel public disclosure of transcripts
from a forty-one day preliminary hearing in the murder trial of Robert Diaz,
again challenged the Superior Court of California in Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court of California (Press-Enterprise II).57 The California Supreme
46. Id. at 606.
47. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
48. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07 (“Where, as in the present case, the State attempts
to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be
shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.”).
49. See id. at 598 (stating that Massachusetts law requires trial judges to exclude the press
and public from the courtroom during the testimony of a minor victim in a sexual offense case).
50. Id. at 607–09.
51. Id. at 609–10.
52. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
53. See id. at 503.
54. Id. at 503–04.
55. See id. at 509–11.
56. See id. at 511–12.
57. 478 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1986).
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Court held that preliminary hearings were not governed by the Richmond
Newspapers test, theorizing that a preliminary hearing is not a criminal trial.58
The Court hinted that the “logic and experience” test should extend beyond
criminal trials, stating, “the First Amendment question cannot be resolved solely
on the label we give the event, i.e., ‘trial’ or otherwise, particularly where the
preliminary hearing functions much like a full-scale trial.”59 The Court
explained that as with criminal trials, there is a long history of openness of
preliminary trials.60 The openness of such hearings, the Court continued, fosters
both fairness and the public perception of fairness, just like the open nature of a
criminal trial.61 Reiterating its previous definitions of the “experience” and
“logic” prongs,62 the Press-Enterprise II Court summarized its jurisprudence on
the issue:
These considerations of experience and logic are, of course, related,
for history and experience shape the functioning of governmental
processes. If the particular proceeding in question passes these tests
of experience and logic, a qualified First Amendment right of public
access attaches. But even when a right of access attaches, it is not
absolute.63
The Press-Enterprise II Court clarified that for closure of a criminal
proceeding, there must be “specific findings” by a court that an unfair trial will
occur without closure and that no other means will suffice to protect the
defendant’s interests.64
5. El Vocero Holds that the Label of “Trial” Is Not Necessary
In El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico,65 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
that the existence of a “trial,” or at least the explicit label of one, is not
dispositive when determining whether a governmental procedure is
presumptively open to the public and press.66 A local newspaper challenged a
58. Id. at 5–7.
59. Id. at 7–9.
60. See id. at 10–11.
61. Id. at 11–13.
62. Id. at 8 (noting that the experience prong looks to “whether the place and process have
historically been open to the press and general public,” while the logic prong examines “whether
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question”).
63. Id. at 9 (emphasis added); see also Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right to Gather News:
A Sequential Interpretation of the First Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 141–
42 (2008).
64. Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 13–14. (“[T]he proceedings cannot be closed unless specific,
on the record findings are made demonstrating that ‘closure is essential to preserve higher values
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’”) (quoting Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal.,
464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).
65. 508 U.S. 147 (1993).
66. Id. 149–50.
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Puerto Rico law closing preliminary hearings for accused criminals.67 As such,
the key inquiry under El Vocero and Press-Enterprise II is not whether this
proceeding is labeled a trial, but instead whether the proceeding functions like a
trial.68 Moreover, the Court clarified that the experience analysis is not
jurisdictionally dependent.69
The experience prong of the Richmond
Newspapers inquiry, the Court explained, must consider the “whole North
American experience, not just the tradition of the local state or territory.”70
Ultimately, Puerto Rico’s rule that a preliminary hearing in a criminal trial was
presumptively closed, unless the defendant moved otherwise, was overturned as
contrary to the First Amendment right of access.71
D. The First Amendment Right of Access Provides Greater Protection of
Public Interests Than the Common Law Right of Access
In addition to the First Amendment right of access that is the centerpiece of
this Comment, a common law presumptive right of access to public records and
documents also exists.72 Courts generally hold that this common law
presumptive right of access imparts a lower form of protection than the First
Amendment right of access.73 Unlike a First Amendment right of access, a
common law presumption of access may be defeated upon a mere showing that
interests in preventing public disclosure of the information are greater than the
public’s interest in accessing it.74
The common law presumptive right of access, while not the focus of this
Comment, often overlaps with the First Amendment presumptive right of access,
and courts often consider them together.75
67. Id. at 148–49.
68. See id. at 149–50.
69. See Richard J. Peltz et. al., The Arkansas Proposal on Access to Court Records:
Upgrading the Common Law with Electronic Freedom of Information Norms, 59 ARK. L. REV.
555, 607 n.310 (2006).
70. Id.
71. El Vocero de Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. at 151.
72. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (“It is clear that
the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and
documents, including judicial records and documents.”); see also Joe Regalia, The Common Law
Right to Information, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 89, 95–96 (2014).
73. See, e.g., Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988)
(“The common law does not afford as much substantive protection to the interests of the press and
the public as does the First Amendment. Under common law, there is a presumption of access
accorded to judicial records. This presumption of access, however, can be rebutted if countervailing
interests heavily outweigh the public interests in access.”) (citations omitted).
74. See id. This lower burden is juxtaposed with the strict scrutiny requirement when the
First Amendment right of access attaches. See id.; see also Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of
Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 509–10 (1984) (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk, 457
U.S. 596, 606–07 (1982)).
75. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Therefore, we
hold that appellants . . . possess a common law right of access to civil trials. Although we could
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E. Courts Extend “Experience and Logic” Outside the Narrow Confines of the
Criminal Trial
1. Civil Trials Are Also Presumptively Open Under the “Experience and
Logic” Test
While the Supreme Court has hinted that the right of access should extend to
civil trials, it has never specifically held that the public and press’s rights of
access extend to civil trials.76 The Third Circuit recognized this in Publicker
Industries, Inc. v. Cohen.77 Nevertheless, the Publicker court also found that an
examination of the same authorities relied upon by the Richmond Newspapers
Court in reaching its decision likewise established a long history of a common
law right of access for the press to civil trials and proceedings.78
The Publicker court then proceeded through a First Amendment analysis of
access to civil proceedings, relying on the Richmond Newspapers “experience
and logic” test and its progeny.79 Evaluating the history of public civil trials, the
Publicker court identified a long history of public civil proceedings in both the
English and American systems of justice.80 The public benefit to having civil
trials open to the public, noted the Publicker court, includes: the increased
likelihood of truthful testimony, the pressure on judicial officers to perform their
duties properly under public scrutiny, and the public’s benefit of education about
the workings of government.81

rest our decision on a common law right of access, the importance in guaranteeing freedoms at
issue here compel us to reach the constitutional issues.”); see also United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d
194, 208 n.19 (3d. Cir. 2007) (citing Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 (1981) (“The parties
also dispute whether the media outlets have a First Amendment right to the [judicial] records. . . .
Because we find that a common law right of access attaches to the [judicial] records, we need not
engage in the First Amendment analysis.”); Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253 (“With regard to substantive
requirements, we find it necessary to decide whether the interests of The Washington Post arise
from the First Amendment or from the common law right of access.”).
76. See Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386–87 n.15 (1979) (“[I]n some civil
cases the public interest in access, and the salutary effect of publicity, may be as strong as, or
stronger than, in most criminal cases”); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 580 n.17 (1980) (“Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not
raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been
presumptively open.”); but see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596,
611 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I interpret neither Richmond Newspapers nor the Court’s
decision today to carry any implications outside the context of criminal trials.”).
77. See 733 F.2d 1059, 1066–67 (3d Cir. 1984).
78. See id.
79. Id. at 1067–68 (“Therefore, we must decide whether the Court’s analysis in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. and in Globe Newspaper Co. leading to its recognition of a First Amendment
guarantee of the public’s and press’ right of access to criminal trials is applicable to civil trials.”).
80. See id. at 1068–70. The Publicker court, for example, considered the writings of Sir
Edward Coke, Sir Matthew Hale, and Sir William Blackstone. Id.
81. See id. at 1069–70 (stating that like criminal trials, access to civil trials “plays an important
role in the participation and the free discussion of governmental affairs”).
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The Publicker court determined the “experience and logic” test was satisfied,
concluding that the First Amendment qualified right of access attaches and that
civil trials are, presumptively, open to the public.82 As with criminal trials, the
Publicker court made it clear that the right of access to civil proceedings is not
absolute and could be restricted if a particular restriction on access survived
strict scrutiny.83
Other courts have also held that both the public and the press hold a qualified
First Amendment right of access to proceedings in civil cases.84 The Sixth
Circuit employed a similar rationale to the Third Circuit in Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. FTC.85 The Fourth Circuit, relying on Richmond Newspapers
and its progeny, including Publicker, found a First Amendment qualified right
of access to documents filed in support of summary judgment motions.86 In
reaching this holding, the Fourth Circuit noted that such motions were akin to
“documents filed in connection with plea hearings and sentencing hearings in
criminal cases,” which were the kind of documents the court previously
understood to have attached a qualified First Amendment right of access.87
2. Courts Extend “Experience and Logic” to Government Processes in the
Administrative State
A circuit split remains, however, as to whether a presumptive right of access
for the public and press attaches to administrative proceedings.88 Access to
deportation hearings held in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks
exemplify this circuit split.89 The Third and Sixth Circuits, while agreeing that

82. Id.
83. See id. at 1070–71.
84. See NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 359 (Cal. 1999).
[T]he high court has not accepted review of any of the numerous lower court cases that
have found a general First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings, and we have
not found a single lower court case holding that generally there is no First Amendment
right of access to civil proceedings.
Id.
85. 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that “[t]he policy considerations discussed
in Richmond Newspapers apply to civil as well as criminal cases”).
86. See Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988).
87. Id.
88. See infra Part I.E.2.a–c.
89. See Kathleen K. Miller, Do Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors? Finding a First
Amendment Right of Access to Deportation Hearings by Re-evaluating the Richmond Newspapers
Test, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646, 658 (2004) (noting how a revision in the way courts interpret
the Richmond Newspapers test could resolve the circuit splits on deportation hearings); see also
Jonathan L. Hafetz, The First Amendment and the Right of Access to Deportation Hearings, 40
CAL. W.L. REV. 265, 268 (2004) (arguing that a First Amendment right of access to deportation
hearings should exist).
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a qualified right to access civil proceedings attaches,90 reached different
conclusions on this particular matter.91
a. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft: Deportation Hearings Are
Presumptively Open
In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft,92 the Sixth Circuit examined whether there
was a First Amendment right of access to deportation hearings in light of the
government’s closure of special interest deportation hearings following the
September 11th terrorist attacks.93 Given Press-Enterprise II’s command that a
strict label of “trial” is not required to apply the test, the Sixth Circuit applied
the “experience and logic” test utilized by numerous courts to proceedings
outside of criminal trials.94
In applying the Richmond Newspapers test to the deportation hearings at
issue, the Sixth Circuit found that a long history of openness measured in years
alone was not dispositive of experience, and further found that hearings on
deportation were traditionally open.95 First, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that no
specific congressional intent to keep such hearings closed existed.96 It also noted
the experience prong was satisfied by deportation hearings because they “‘walk,
talk, and squawk’ very much like a judicial proceeding.”97 As for the logic
prong, the Sixth Circuit concluded that, pursuant to Richmond Newspapers and
its progeny, public access to deportation hearings would meet the logic prong,
as public access would help to ensure fairness of the proceedings by pressuring
the government to carry out its duties properly.98 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit
held that opening such proceedings to the public in this context could provide
for “public catharsis” in the wake of the September 11th attacks.99 Further, the
Sixth Circuit stated that having such proceedings open would enhance public
perception of the proceedings’ fairness and would inform citizens about the
inner workings of government.100

90. See Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066–67 (3d Cir. 1984); Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1179.
91. See Detroit Free Press Court v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683–85 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding
that deportation hearings are presumptively open under a Richmond Newspapers analysis); see also
N. Jersey Media Grp. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 201–02 (3d. Cir. 2002) (finding the Richmond
Newspapers test unsatisfied).
92. 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
93. Id. at 682–83.
94. See id. at 695–96.
95. See id. at 701.
96. See id. at 701–02.
97. Id. at 702 (paraphrasing Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 744
(2002)).
98. See id. at 703–05.
99. See id. at 704.
100. See id. at 704–05.
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b. North Jersey Media Group: Deportation Hearings Do Not Satisfy
“Experience and Logic”
The Third Circuit, in North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft,101 agreed
with the Sixth Circuit that access to deportation hearings should be examined
under the “experience and logic” test.102 The Third Circuit, however, held that
there was not a sufficient history of open deportation hearings to support an
argument that the experience prong of the Richmond Newspapers test was
met.103 While conceding that the experience prong did not necessarily require
an extensive centuries-long historical examination, the court, nonetheless, called
for a “rigorous experience test” regarding access to administrative
proceedings.104 According to the Third Circuit, any policy to the contrary would
undermine the long-standing flexibility given to administrative agencies in
conducting their own business by their own rules.105 Nonetheless, the court did
not prescribe a bright-line rule for how to establish history sufficient to meet the
“experience” prong.106
In evaluating the logic prong, the court admitted that deportation hearings
resembled judicial trials, but found the logic prong unsatisfied for other
reasons.107 The court did not dispute that openness of such hearings would likely
serve the “public benefit” in a number of ways as described under Richmond
Newspapers and its progeny.108 Rather, the Third Circuit invoked a balancing
test focusing on a number of concerns raised by the government, all centered on
the concern that opening such hearings could undermine the government’s
ability to fight terrorism.109 While the concern that opening such a proceeding
to the public undermines the ability of the government to combat terrorism is

101. 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
102. See id. at 206–09 (stating “Richmond Newspapers is a test broadly applicable to issues of
access to government proceedings, including removal”).
103. See id. at 211.
104. See id. at 213, 216.
105. See id. at 216.
106. See id. (“By insisting on a strong tradition of public access in the Richmond Newspapers
test, we preserve administrative flexibility and avoid constitutionalizing ambiguous, and potentially
unconsidered, executive decisions.”).
107. See id.
108. Id. at 217.
109. See id. at 218–19. The concerns expressed by the North Jersey Media Group court
include: (1) “reveal[ing] sources and methods of investigation”; (2) creating opportunities for
terrorists to “exploit weaknesses” in the national security apparatus; (3) putting terrorist prisoners
on notice about what information the United States does or does not have about them; (4) if
terrorists know a member is being subjected to a hearing, they may accelerate a particular attack in
order to carry it through before the government discovers the plot; (5) allowing terrorist groups the
opportunity to interfere with evidence needed for the hearing; (6) the privacy rights of those
subjected to such hearings; and (7) the impracticality of closing such hearings on a case-by-case
basis. Id.
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speculative, the court rationalized its holding stating “the Richmond Newspapers
logic prong is unavoidably speculative.”110
The Third Circuit avoided the Supreme Court’s command against closure
based on speculative arguments by holding that such a bar existed only if a First
Amendment right existed in the first place.111
c. Other Forms of Administrative Hearings Have Seen Mixed Results
Other types of administrative proceedings have seen mixed results when the
“experience and logic” test is applied.112 The Sixth Circuit, for example, found
that administrative disciplinary adjudications at public universities could not
satisfy the test because these proceedings have not been historically open to the
public due to privacy concerns.113 The Sixth Circuit noted that opening such
proceedings to the public would serve no useful purpose, as the policies at stake
affect only the relationship between a particular student and the university.114
Thus, the public value of opening criminal or civil trials was not found to be
present in university adjudication.115
The Second Circuit applied the “experience and logic” test to the adjudicative
proceedings for violators of the New York City Transit Authority’s
regulations.116 In finding the experience prong satisfied, the Second Circuit
analogized the proceedings to the workings of a trial and noted that the
administrative proceedings at issue determined whether an accused party
violated a regulation and could be, as a result, punished by the force of a
government entity.117 Before the inception of the administrative body, the court
further elaborated, such hearings were historically conducted as traditional court
proceedings, and those hearings were presumptively open to the public.118
The Second Circuit agreed that public access would benefit the public’s
interest, thereby satisfying the logic prong, because open proceedings would
help to provide a sense of fairness and justice in determining whether individuals
were rightfully punished by a governmental body.119 Because the transit
authority is a governmental body, the Second Circuit found that open access to

110. Id. at 219.
111. See id. at 219 n.14.
112. See infra notes 113–21 and accompanying text.
113. See United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 822–23 (6th Cir. 2002).
114. See id. at 822 (“[S]tudent disciplinary proceedings govern the relationship between a
student and his or her university, not the relationship between a citizen and ‘The People.’”).
115. See id. at 823. (“We find that public access will not aid in the functioning of traditionally
closed student disciplinary proceedings; accordingly, The Chronicle does not enjoy a qualified First
Amendment right of access to such proceedings.”).
116. See N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 301–03 (2d Cir.
2011).
117. See id. at 301.
118. See id. at 301–02.
119. See id. at 303.
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its proceedings would also help to educate the public about the governmental
process at play.120 As such, the public values present in trials were found to be
present in transit authority hearings, satisfying the logic prong.121
F. Access to the Polling Place: The Next Frontier for Applying Richmond
Newspapers
As noted previously, the impetus for this Comment is whether the “experience
and logic” test commands a presumption of openness to the governmental
process at the polling place.122 The Third and Sixth Circuits, again, are split on
this issue.123
1. Beacon Journal: Ohio Statute Restricting Press Access to the Polls
Violated the First Amendment Rights of the Press
In Beacon Journal Publishing Co., Inc. v. Blackwell,124 the Sixth Circuit
examined whether the First Amendment rights of a newspaper were violated
under an Ohio state law restricting access to the polling place by prohibiting
anyone from coming within a certain distance of the entrance to the polling
place, except to vote or work at the polls.125 Notably, the statute contained an
exception for the press to have “reasonable access to a polling place,”126 but in
late October 2004, Ohio’s Secretary of State, Ken Blackwell, issued a directive
saying, “the statute’s prohibition applies to anyone.”127 As such, the Beacon
Journal Publishing Company challenged the law as it was enforced.128 Ohio
justified the law by citing “a compelling interest in making sure that voters vote
freely and without intimidation.”129

120. Id.
121. See id. at 302–03.
122. See supra text accompanying note 7.
123. See PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91 (3d Cir. 2013); Beacon Journal Publ’g Co.,
Inc. v. Blackwell, 389 F.3d 683, 685 (6th Cir. 2004); see also infra notes 124–49 and accompanying
text.
124. 389 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2004).
125. See id. at 684; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.35(B)(1) (West 2014).
Except as otherwise provided . . . no person who is not an election official, employee,
observer, or police officer shall be allowed to enter the polling place during the election,
except for the purpose of voting or assisting another person to vote as provided in section
3505.24 of the Revised Code.
Id.
126. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.35(B)(2). “Notwithstanding any provision of this section
to the contrary, a journalist shall be allowed reasonable access to a polling place during an election.
As used in this division, ‘journalist’ has the same meaning as in division (B)(2) of section 2923.129
of the Revised Code.” Id.
127. Beacon Journal, 389 F.3d at 684.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Pointing out that the newspaper’s intent was to report on the events taking
place at the polling place on Election Day, and not to disturb the voting rights of
Ohio citizens, the Sixth Circuit found strict scrutiny unsatisfied by the
government, and that, therefore, the law unconstitutionally burdened the First
Amendment rights of the press.130 Whether “experience and logic” provided the
foundation for this holding is unclear from the court’s opinion.131 The Sixth
Circuit, however, quotes Detroit Free Press, saying “[t]his [c]ourt has recently
observed that ‘[d]emocracies die behind closed doors,’” and that “the public
‘deputize[s] the press as the guardians of their liberty.’”132
As such, the court hints, at minimum, that it considered the public values
recognized in its earlier First Amendment right of access jurisprudence without
explicitly saying so.133 Further, it suggests that it intended to build upon its
Detroit Free Press jurisprudence.134
2. PG Publishing: Access to the Polling Place Does Not Satisfy the
“Experience and Logic” Test
The Third Circuit, in PG Publishing Co. v. Aichele,135 reviewed a press
entity’s challenge to a Pennsylvania statute that required “[a]ll persons, except
election officers, clerks, machine inspectors, overseers, watchers, persons in the
course of voting, persons lawfully giving assistance to voters, and peace and
police officers . . . remain at least ten (10) feet distant from the polling place
during the progress of the voting.”136 First noting a public right of access exists
generally within the First Amendment, the Third Circuit then devoted several
pages to the balancing test prescribed for the First Amendment right of access—

130. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend I) (finding the “fear of ‘turmoil that could be created by
hordes of reporters and photographers’ is purely hypothetical and cannot, therefore, support
[Ohio’s] proposed restriction of the First Amendment’s guarantee that state conduct shall not
abridge ‘freedom . . . of the press’”).
131. It is not abundantly clear what test the Beacon Journal court applied to reach its
conclusion. See PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 112–13 (3d Cir. 2013) (averring that the
Beacon Journal opinion failed to establish a “basis for its decision”). In fact, the court in explaining
its rationale uses neither the term “experience” nor “logic.” See Beacon Journal, 389 F.3d at 685.
Nevertheless, one can infer that the Sixth Circuit at least considered the Richmond Newspapers test,
as the court cites to Detroit Free Press and remarks that the state’s purported justification for the
law is “purely hypothetical and cannot, therefore, support Defendants’ proposed restriction.” Id.
132. Beacon Journal, 389 F.3d at 685 (quoting Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681,
683 (6th Cir. 2002)).
133. See id. (“With these principles in mind, we find that Plaintiffs present a strong likelihood
of success on the merits of their challenge to Defendants’ enforcement of Blackwell’s directive.”).
134. See id.
135. 705 F.3d 91 (3d Cir. 2013).
136. Id. at 95; 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3060(d) (2014).
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ultimately leading to the “experience and logic” test prescribed by Richmond
Newspapers and its progeny.137
The court then detailed the Third Circuit’s jurisprudence on the “experience
and logic” test, acknowledging that it had extended the analysis to governmental
processes other than criminal trials, including civil trials and administrative
proceedings.138 The court considered the “experience and logic” test the proper
inquiry for analyzing a right of access to the polling place, as it involved “access
to information about governmental bodies and their actions or decisions.”139
Moreover, the Third Circuit had previously applied the “experience and logic”
test to Article I and II proceedings, and held that voting is covered by Article
I.140 The Third Circuit then evaluated voting under the experience prong.
Because polling advanced from voice vote to secret ballot at the polling place
since the founding of the United States, the Third Circuit concluded that no such
long-standing history of openness to the polling place existed.141 The Third
Circuit, finding the experience prong not satisfied, focused on the history of
openness as viewed through the lens of the individual voter himself, rather than
through the lens of the public’s right to information about the process in play.142
In applying the logic prong, the court stated that it must balance both the
benefits of opening the process to the public and press, as well as the potential
harms of such openness.143 The Third Circuit conceded that openness could be
useful in preventing voter fraud and in allowing the public to examine the
fairness of the process.144 But in evaluating the harm, the court noted that the
potential access of numerous reporters to the polling place, particularly when
citizens were “necessarily exchanging personal information in preparation for
casting a private vote, could concern, intimidate or even turn away potential
voters.”145 Finding the “experience and logic” test unsatisfied, the Third Circuit

137. See PG Publ’g Co., 705 F.3d at 98–99, 100–02. The Third Circuit also devotes several
pages to explaining that a right of access is not the same as a right to speech itself. See id. at 99–
102.
138. See id. at 104–06.
139. Id. at 106–07 (“[A]ccess to information about governmental bodies and their actions or
decisions—must be evaluated with an eye toward the historical and structural role of the
proceeding.”).
140. See id. at 107 (“In North Jersey, we held that the ‘experience and logic’ test applies to
government proceedings under Articles I and II of the Constitution. Such proceedings include,
among other things, the process of voting.”).
141. See id. at 109–10 (relying on Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200–05 (1992)).
142. See id.
143. Id. at 111 (quoting N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir.
2002)) (“Indeed, the logic analysis must account for the negative effects of openness, for otherwise
‘it is difficult to conceive of a government proceeding to which the public would not have a First
Amendment right of access.’”).
144. See id. at 111–12.
145. Id. at 112.
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concluded that no presumptive right of access to the polling place for the press
existed.146
Notably, the Third Circuit criticized the holding in Beacon Journal, stating
that the Sixth Circuit inappropriately applied strict scrutiny under a “public
forum access” test, instead of the appropriate “experience and logic” test.147
According to the PG Publishing court, applying a “public forum access” analysis
to the polling place—what the Third Circuit considered to be a nonpublic
forum—could actually allow for less access to governmental proceedings than
the Richmond Newspapers balancing test.148 The Third Circuit also noted that
the only court decision that relied on the Beacon Journal court’s holding was, in
fact, the district court decision under review in this case.149
Even overlooking the potentially narrow historical inquiry undertaken by the
Third Circuit,150 it remains difficult to understand how applying a lesser
“reasonableness” standard of scrutiny to the government in polling place access
legislation better prevents the very same government from “hid[ing] their
activities from the public’s view” than a strict scrutiny standard.151
II. THE RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS TEST, WHEN APPLIED, SHOULD OPEN THE
POLLING PLACE TO THE PRESS AND PUBLIC
While it is not necessarily clear that the Sixth Circuit avoided the “experience
and logic” test altogether in deciding Beacon Journal,152 the Third Circuit
unambiguously relied upon the analytical framework, saying “access to
government proceedings—in effect, access to information about governmental
bodies and their actions or decisions—must be evaluated with an eye toward the
historical and structural role of the proceeding.”153 One commentator recently
argued that the use of the “experience and logic” test, in the manner the Third
Circuit applied it, “properly framed the constitutional issue as a question of right
of access to information, forestalled the government from potentially exploiting
nonpublic fora, and protected contemporaneous First Amendment principles.”154
146. Id.
147. See id. at 113.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 113 n.25; see also PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 902 F.Supp.2d 724, 754 (W.D. Pa.
2012).
150. See First Amendment —Public Access —Third Circuit Holds that First Amendment Does
Not Afford the Public a Protected Right of Access to Polling Places for News-Gathering
Purposes.— PG Publishing Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1067 (2014) (believing
the Third Circuit ignored “the long history of racial discrimination and disenfranchisement that has
accompanied the closed polling process”).
151. See PG Publ’g Co., 705 F.3d at 113.
152. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
153. PG Publ’g Co., 705 F.3d at 106–07.
154. Nicole Lessin, Voting for Balance: The Third Circuit Splits with the Sixth Circuit Over
the Press’s Right to Access Polling Stations in PG Publishing Co. v. Aichele, 55 B.C. L. REV. ESUPPLEMENT 183, 192 (2014).
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Indeed, simply understanding the framework’s applicability to the polling place
is achievable by examining the polling place through the lens of Justice
Brennan’s Richmond Newspapers concurrence.155
Justice Brennan’s concurrence states “[f]irst, the case for a right of access has
special force when drawn from an enduring and vital tradition of public entree
to particular proceedings or information.”156 Justice Brennan further opined,
“what is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular government
process is important in terms of that very process.”157 He then writes, “[t]o
resolve the case before us . . . we must consult historical and current practice . .
. and weigh the importance of public access.”158 Justice Brennan suggests that
the test should be used for all governmental processes, not just trials, broadly
characterizing trials as “a genuine governmental proceeding.”159
A. The “Experience and Logic” Test Is the Correct Test Because Voting Is a
Government Process
Article I of the Constitution states: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”160 The Supreme
Court has stated that this Elections Clause gives states the power to “prescribe
the procedural mechanisms for holding congressional elections.”161
Most scholars, as well as the Supreme Court, agree that there is no explicit
federal right to vote granted in the Constitution.162 Yet, the right of a citizen to
vote has been directly addressed several times in amendments to the U.S.
Constitution,163 and more specifically, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
155. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
156. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 595–96.
160. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The Seventeenth Amendment now overrides the final
provision of Section 4, clause 1 regarding the “chusing of Senators.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
As noted previously, voting rights and the controversial jurisprudence surrounding it in recent years
are not the focus of this paper.
161. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001).
162. See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 89, 91 (2014) (noting that the explicit right to vote is granted to citizens via the constitutions
of their respective states).
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (constitutionalizing the popular election of
U.S. Senators); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”); U.S. CONST.
amend. XXIII, § 1 (granting electoral votes for President and Vice President to the District of
Columbia); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote in
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protects the rights of all citizens to vote regardless of race or color and bars the
use of any “standard, practice, or procedure” to interfere with citizens’ voting
rights.164 Judicially, any abridgement of the right to vote has been explicitly
subjected to strict scrutiny.165 Voting, therefore, is clearly a government
process, and access to it should be evaluated under the “experience and logic”
test of Richmond Newspapers.
B. Experience and Logic Are Necessarily Satisfied When Applied to the
Polling Place
1. Experience: It is Common Practice to Have “Others” in the Polling
Place
As the Court stated in El Vocero, when considering experience, a court should
“not look to the particular practice of any one jurisdiction, but instead ‘to the
experience in that type or kind of hearing throughout the United States.’”166
any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice
President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”); U.S. CONST.
amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or
older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
age.”).
164. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2015).
165. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The Carolene
Court upheld the statute at issue under a deferential standard, but it noted a less deferential standard
would be needed
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held
to be embraced within the Fourteenth. It is unnecessary to consider now whether
legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial
scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other
types of legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote, on restraints upon the
dissemination of information, on interferences with political organizations as to
prohibition of peaceable assembly. Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations
enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial
minorities; whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. at 152 n.4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434
(1992) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon
the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected to ‘severe’
restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of
compelling importance.’
Id.
166. El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 150 (1993) (quoting Rivera-Puig
v. Garcia-Rosario, 983 F.2d 311, 323 (1st Cir. 1992)).
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Though the El Vocero Court referred specifically to preliminary criminal
hearings, Press-Enterprise II consistently refers to analyzing government
“processes” under the “experience and logic” test.167
a. A Number of States Allow for Public and News Media Access Beyond
Just Voters
A survey of a number of states’ voting laws suggests that it is actually
common practice to allow members of the public, as well as news media, into
the polling place for purposes beyond simply casting a ballot.168 Virginia,
Tennessee, and Oklahoma, for example, specifically allow members of the news
media to enter the polling place, although there are reasonable limits placed on
their access.169 Wisconsin permits entry to the polls rather broadly, allowing
“[a]ny member of the public [to] be present at any polling place . . . or . . .
[location where] absentee ballots may be cast.”170 The language of Nevada’s
administrative code is similarly broad, allowing “any person [to] observe the
conduct of voting at a polling place” subject only to minor restrictions.171

167. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986).
168. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 681(4) (2014) (“If sufficient space exists,
party workers and others, in addition to the pollwatchers allowed pursuant to section 627, may
remain in the voting place outside the guardrail enclosure as long as they do not attempt to influence
voters or interfere with their free passage.”) (emphasis added); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 7-112 (2014)
(“[A] news reporter or photographer may, in the course of covering the election being conducted,
be allowed inside the election enclosure for a period not to exceed five (5) minutes.”); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 2-7-103(a) (2014) (“No person may be admitted to a polling place while the procedures
required by this chapter are being carried out except election officials, voters, persons properly
assisting voters, the press, poll watchers appointed under § 2-7-104 and others bearing written
authorization from the county election commission.”) (emphasis added); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2604(J) (2014) (“The officers of election shall permit representatives of the news media to visit and
film or photograph inside the polling place for a reasonable and limited period of time while the
polls are open.”) (emphasis added); WIS. STAT. § 7.41(1) (2014) (“Any member of the public may
be present at any polling place, in the office of any municipal clerk whose office is located in a
public building on any day that absentee ballots may be cast in that office, or at an alternate site
under § 6.855 on any day that absentee ballots may be cast at that site for the purpose of observation
of an election and the absentee ballot voting process, except a candidate whose name appears on
the ballot at the polling place or on an absentee ballot to be cast at the clerk’s office or alternate site
at that election.”) (emphasis added). The author of this article does not represent that this list of
statutes is exhaustive. Instead, in conducting a survey of such state statutes, the author, in the spirit
of a “general” look at the “experience” in various jurisdictions, attempted to include a wide range
of geographically and culturally diverse sections of the United States.
169. See select statutes cited supra note 168.
170. WIS. STAT. § 7.41(1) (2014).
171. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 293.245(1) (2014).
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b. “Poll Watchers”
Moreover, numerous states allow for so-called “poll watchers” to be present
in the polling places.172 These “poll watchers” are typically representatives of
candidates seeking office or political parties.173 A number of state statutes
specifically reference poll watchers and allow them to access the polls on behalf
of candidates or political parties.174
c. When Examined Broadly—as Prescribed by the Supreme Court—
Access to the Polling Place Satisfies the “Experience” Prong
History suggests a broad reading of the experience prong. In Globe
Newspaper, the Supreme Court solidified Justice Brennan’s Richmond
Newspapers concurrence, stating, “a tradition of accessibility implies the
172. Gilda R. Daniels, Senator Edward Kennedy: A Lion for Voting Rights, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 415, 434–35 (2011) (noting that a number of states allow for so-called “poll
watchers” or “challengers”); John Tanner, Effective Monitoring of Polling Places, 61 BAYLOR L.
REV. 50, 77 (2009) (“There is a provision in each state for poll watchers appointed by political
parties, candidates, or other groups, although their number, qualifications, and role varies
considerably.”).
173. See Daniels, supra note 172, at 434–35; Tanner, supra note 172, at 77–78.
174. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 97.140(b) (2014) (“A party may be represented
at the polling places by observers.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-408 (2014); ME. STAT. tit. 21, § 627(4)
(2014) (“Municipalities must provide a polling place large enough to allow at least one worker
from each political party to remain outside the guardrail enclosure as a pollwatcher.”) (emphasis
added); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 10-311(a)(1) (West 2014) (“The following persons or
entities have the right to designate a registered voter as a challenger or a watcher at each place of
registration and election: (i) the State Board for any polling place in the State; (ii) a local board for
any polling place located in the county of the local board; (iii) a candidate; (iv) a political party;
and (v) any other group of voters supporting or opposing a candidate, principle, or proposition on
the ballot.”) (emphasis added); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-13-120 (2014) (“The election judges shall
permit one poll watcher from each political party to be stationed close to the poll lists in a location
that does not interfere with the election procedures.”) (emphasis added); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 1313-121 (2014) (“A candidate, a group of candidates, or any group having an interest in the election
may request the election administrator to allow additional poll watchers at any precinct.”); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-45(a) (West 2014) (granting the right of the chair of political parties, and
campaign managers for unaffiliated candidates, the power to appoint poll watchers); tit. 19 R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-19-22 (West 2014) (allowing for representatives, runners, and watchers
from each political party to be present at the polling place and observe the voting process); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 2-7-104(a) (2014) (allowing political parties, citizen organizations, and candidates
to have poll watchers present at the polling place); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (West 2014)
(defining a “watcher” as “a person appointed under this subchapter to observe the conduct of an
election on behalf of a candidate, a political party, or the proponents or opponents of a measure.”)
(emphasis added); (West 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604(c) (2014) (“The officers of election
shall permit one authorized representative of each political party or independent candidate in a
general or special election, or one authorized representative of each candidate in a primary
election, to remain in the room in which the election is being conducted at all times.”) (emphasis
added). Again, with this survey of state statutes and regulations, the author of this article does not
represent the aforementioned laws to be an exhaustive list of state statutes and regulations regarding
this matter. Instead, the author has intended to provide examples of similar state statutes and
regulations that represent a wide geographic and cultural diversity among jurisdictions.
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favorable judgment of experience.”175 Justice Brennan’s concurrence, as some
commentators suggest, sought to go beyond a mere number of years of openness
and analyze the inherent or normative value of having such a process be open.176
Other commentators suggest that, in applying the experience prong, the El
Vocero Court, while exclusively analyzing the openness of preliminary hearings
in Puerto Rico, further clarified that the experience test looks beyond the history
of a particular jurisdiction or locality, and instead looks to prevailing laws across
the United States—again, a judicial broadening of the experience inquiry.177
The number of states that allow news media, members of the public, and poll
watchers into the polls, as detailed previously, demonstrates that public access
to the polling place, beyond that of the simple voter, is common and meets the
“experience” prong, especially when applied broadly.178
2. Logic: The Public Interests at Stake Will Necessarily Be Enhanced by
Public Access
As detailed extensively above,179 the experience prong is not the end of the
analysis—the logic prong remains. In order to determine whether the logic
prong is met, Richmond Newspapers and its progeny teach that a court must
consider “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the
functioning of the particular process in question.”180 Namely, courts must
examine whether openness of the process in question would help ensure fairness
of the process, promote the appearance of the process’ fairness, and provide
citizens with enhanced confidence in the government.181
a. The Public Interests Are Analogous to Those Interests Already
Determined to be Presumptively Open
As detailed above, a presumption of openness to the public and the press in
criminal trials and proceedings serves a number of valuable public interests,
including: fairness to those subjected to criminal justice, the appearance of
fairness to the public, a societal catharsis that justice and fairness have been

175. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982)
(quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
176. See, e.g., First Amendment—Public Access—Third Circuit Holds that First Amendment
Does Not Afford the Public a Protected Right of Access to Polling Places for News-Gathering
Purposes, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1067, 1071–73 (2014).
177. See El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1993).
178. See supra Part II.B.1.a–b.
179. See supra Part I.C.
180. Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
181. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
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carried out, and an enhancement of society’s confidence in the workings of its
government.182
Lower courts have extended this logic to civil trials on similar grounds: public
scrutiny resulting in a greater likelihood of fairness to the parties involved,
greater pressure on officials carrying out duties to do so in the proper manner,
and enhancing the public’s awareness of its government and the processes in
which it engages.183 In establishing the logic of allowing public and press
attendance for administrative proceedings, lower courts have noted similar
rationales: an assurance of fairness in the process, a catharsis of the public that
justice and fairness have been properly administered, and education of the public
about the workings of the government process in question.184 Further, as the
Richmond Newspapers Court stated, praising the role the press plays in serving
as a funnel of information to society,185 the public value served by access
pertains not just to particular individuals, but also to the public as a whole.186
Whether in criminal or civil trials, administrative hearings, or at the polling
place, similar interests are at stake. Voting is a fundamental right of citizens.187
Many commentators, regardless of their stances on the overall correctness of
such measures, agree that a number of new laws requiring voter identification
have come to fruition in a number of states.188 Indeed, in 2008, the Supreme

182. See supra Part I.C.; see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570–
72 (1980); Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have
confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone
is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that
deviations will become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the
criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the
system.
Id.; see also Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 9.
183. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1069–70 (3d Cir. 1984); see also
supra Part I.E.1.
184. See supra Part I.E.2.; see also New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Transit
Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 303 (2d Cir. 2011); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 703–05 (6th
Cir. 2002).
185. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 577 n.12.
186. See id. at 570–72.
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. See, e.g., Brandon S. Baker, Note, Texas v. Holder: How Texas Can Enact a Stringent
Voter ID Law and Avoid Section 3(c) Clearance, 8 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 371, 377–86 (2014); David
M. Faherty, Comment, The Post-Crawford Rise in Voter ID Laws: A Solution Still in Search of a
Problem, 66 ME. L. REV. 269, 278–85 (2013); Claire Foster Martin, Comment, Block the Vote:
How a New Wave of State Election Laws Is Rolling Unevenly Over Voters & the Dilemma of How
to Prevent It, 43 CUMB. L. REV. 95, 103–10 (2013); Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars,
Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV 1865, 1872
(2013); Joel A. Heller, Note, Fearing Fear Itself: Photo Identification Laws, Fear of Fraud, and
the Fundamental Right to Vote, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1877–78 (2009); Hans A. von Spakovsky,
Protecting the Integrity of the Election Process, 11 ELECTION L.J. 90, 90–91 (2012).
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Court upheld voter identification laws in Indiana.189 Justifying its rationale, the
Supreme Court noted, “flagrant examples of such fraud in other parts of the
country have been documented throughout this Nation’s history by respected
historians and journalists.”190
Again, the same policy interests enumerated in judicial opinions appear in
legal arguments both for and against voter rights law. One commentator, in
discussing the rise of new election laws in recent years, mentioned “a raft of new
election laws that were passed by Republican-controlled legislatures and
administrative actions taken mostly by Republican secretaries of state.
Democrats and voting rights groups charged that these new laws and procedures
made it harder for voters to register and cast their ballots.”191 In advocating for
tough judicial scrutiny of voter identification laws, another commentator stated,
“[p]hoto ID requirements make voting more difficult for some voters and
impossible for others.”192 But another commentator, supporting voter
identification laws, wrote, “[s]uch measures increase public confidence in our
election process.”193 Indeed, as part of its justification for seeking access to the
polls, the PG Publishing Company argued that a new voter identification law in
Pennsylvania was a primary reason that the public needed full press access to
the polling place.194
More recently, in September 2014, the Seventh Circuit vacated the Eastern
District of Wisconsin’s enjoinment of Wisconsin’s voter identification law.195
Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, in response, praised the ruling as protective
of the voting process.196 Wisconsin Congresswoman Gwen Moore, by contrast,

189. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008) (“In sum, on the basis
of the record that has been made in this litigation, we cannot conclude that the statute imposes
‘excessively burdensome requirements’ on any class of voters.”).
190. Id. at 195.
191. Hasen, supra note 188, at 1872.
192. Heller, supra note 188, at 1891.
193. Von Spakovsky, supra note 188, at 90.
194. PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 111–12 (3d Cir. 2013) The Third Circuit noted:
Appellant argues that access to the polling place was particularly necessary during this
past election because of the Voter ID Law. More specifically, Appellant argues that the
Voter ID Law—part of which was suspended for purposes of the November 6, 2012
election—may have caused voter confusion as to whether identification is required in
order to cast a vote. As a result, Appellant argues that it was of the utmost importance
for reporters to observe and record the goings on at the sign-in table during this election.
Id.
195. Frank v. Walker, 766 F.3d 755, 756 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The panel has concluded that the
state’s probability of success on the merits of this appeal is sufficiently great that the state should
be allowed to implement its law, pending further order of this court.”).
196. Press Release, Office of Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, Governor Scott Walker
Statement on Voter ID Ruling (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/newsroom/pressrelease/governor-scott-walker-statement-voter-id-ruling (“This ruling is a win for the electoral
process and voters of Wisconsin. Voter ID is a common sense reform that protects the integrity of
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criticized the decision as an attack on voters’ rights and the principles of
democracy.197 Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit, reaching the merits, held
Wisconsin’s voter ID law constitutionally valid in October 2014.198 Yet, only a
few days later, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the law’s implementation.199
Other states’ controversial voting laws have been the subject of recent federal
cases. For example, on October 9, 2014, a federal district court held in Veasey
v. Perry200 that a Texas law mandating that voters produce photo ID in order to
vote was an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote, as well as an
unconstitutional poll tax.201 On October 14, 2014, the Fifth Circuit stayed the
ruling pending an appeal.202 The Supreme Court left the stay in place, over a
vigorous dissent from Justice Ginsburg, who wrote, “[t]he greatest threat to
public confidence in elections in this case is the prospect of enforcing a
purposefully discriminatory law, one that likely imposes an unconstitutional poll
tax and risks denying the right to vote to hundreds of thousands of eligible
voters.”203
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that
the law’s discriminatory effects violated the Voting Rights Act, while vacating
the district court’s holding that the law had a discriminatory purpose, and that
the law was a poll tax.204 Texas Governor Greg Abbott responded by stating,
“[i]n light of ongoing voter fraud, it is imperative that Texas has a voter ID law
that prevents cheating at the ballot box. Texas will continue to fight for its voter
ID requirement to ensure the integrity of elections in the Lone Star State.”205 In
contrast, the lead plaintiff Texas Congressman Marc Veasey, applauded the
ruling, stating “the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit has taken the first

our voting process. It’s important that voters have confidence in the system. Today’s ruling makes
it easier to vote and harder to cheat.”).
197. Press Release, Office of U.S. Representative Gwen Moore, Gwen Moore Responds to 7th
Circuit’s Ruling on Wisconsin Voter ID Law (Sept. 12, 2014), http://gwenmoore.house.gov/
press-releases/gwen-moore-responds-to-7th-circuits-ruling-on-wisconsins-voter-id-law1/ (“This
decision is a grave injustice for those who lack the necessary photo identification that this law
requires. Creating unnecessary barriers at the polls, barriers that would significantly impact lowincome, elderly, and racial and ethnic minority voters, is a blatant violation of the basic principles
of American democracy.”).
198. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2014).
199. Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7, 8 (2014).
200. 71 F.Supp.3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
201. Id. at 633 (“The Court holds that SB 14 creates an unconstitutional burden on the right to
vote, has an impermissible discriminatory effect against Hispanics and African-Americans, and
was imposed with an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose. The Court further holds that SB 14
constitutes an unconstitutional poll tax.”)
202. Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 896 (5th Cir. 2014).
203. Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 9–10 (2014).
204. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 519–20 (5th Cir. 2015).
205. Press Release, Office of Texas Governor Greg Abbott, Governor Abbott Statement on
Texas Voter ID Law (Aug. 6, 2015), http://gov.texas.gov/news/press-release/21284.
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steps towards ensuring that all Texans have unfettered access to the ballot
box.”206
Also, in October 2014, the Fourth Circuit remanded a case concerning a
restrictive North Carolina voting law to the district court, instructing the district
court to enforce the provisions in the law that prohibited same-day voter
registration and counting votes cast in the wrong precinct.207 The Supreme
Court stayed the Fourth Circuit ruling over a dissent from Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor.208
The aforementioned cases, as well as the commentaries and statements in
reaction to those cases, demonstrate that the public interests at stake regarding
the polling place—notably fairness and the appearance of fairness to the
public—are analogous to those considered by courts in applying the “experience
and logic” test to criminal trials, civil trials, and administrative proceedings. For
example, both supporters and critics of increased scrutiny of voter eligibility
echo the idea of fairness and justice in the voting process.209 Even the Supreme
Court, divided over the merits of these state laws, stressed the potential threat of
voter fraud, and the potential damage to the process’s fairness.210
The sharp disagreements discussed above, moreover, suggest concerns by
both sides about the perception of fair elections at the polling place.211 Unlike
the closed proceedings in North Jersey Media Group and Miami University,
secretive processes at the polling place will not serve government interests, nor
are the interests at stake strictly and solely between individuals and a particular
institution or entity.212
b. The Public Will Benefit from Scrutiny of the Government Process by
the Press
Because the fairness and the public perception of fairness are both implicated
by the voting process, public access to the polling place, particularly by way of
the press, will benefit the public, the voting process itself, and satisfy the logic
prong. As discussed previously, a number of states allow for “poll watchers,”
who are individuals typically appointed by parties and candidates with interests
in the outcome.213 “Poll watchers,” one particular group notes, “shine a partisan
light on polling place procedures to prevent voter fraud—by the polling place

206. Press Release, Office of U.S. Representative Marc Veasey, Rep. Veasey Statement on
Texas Voter ID Ruling (Aug. 5, 2015), http://veasey.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/repveasey-statement-on-texas-voter-id-ruling.
207. See League of Women Voters v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 248–29 (4th Cir. 2014).
208. See North Carolina v. League of Women Voters, 135 S. Ct. 6, 6 (2014).
209. See supra notes 191–98 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 188–208 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 101–21 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
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official, the putative voter, or a combination of both—from diluting legal
votes.”214
The press, in contrast to poll watchers, is defined broadly as “[t]he news
media; print and broadcast news organizations collectively.”215 The press, in
theory, does not have a dog in the fight. Proclaimed “surrogates for the
public,”216 the press is “designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses
of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for
keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they
were selected to serve.”217
If persons with a known interest in the outcome of an election can be allowed
into polling places, members of the press should likewise have a presumptive
First Amendment right to view the process. The attachment of a qualified First
Amendment presumption for the press to access polling places, justifiably
identical to notions of fairness at criminal trials, civil trials, and administrative
proceedings, will likewise benefit society at large.
C. There Are Appropriate Checks in Place to Protect Against Adverse Effects
of Allowing Public and Press Access to the Polling Place
A presumptive First Amendment right of access does not have to signal a
mandate for mayhem at the polls. First, many of the statutes previously
discussed that specifically allow for public and press access, have safety
mechanisms built into them.218 Second, courts that apply the “experience and
logic” test generally remind readers that a presumptive right of access is not an
absolute right.219 Third, the closure or restriction on access of a presumptively
open governmental process can be judicially approved if strict scrutiny is met.220
The Virginia statute, for example, allows for the news media to enter the
polling place, while specifically prohibiting the media from filming voters
214. Heather Heidelbaugh, Logan Fisher & James Miller, Protecting the Integrity of the
Polling Place: A Constitutional Defense of Poll Watcher Statutes, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 217, 218
(2009) (arguing, generally, that poll watcher statutes are constitutional); see also Tanner, supra
note 172, at 79. He notes:
There is potential for the perception of bias on the part of monitors, and many people
who are willing to spend hours at the polls will have a dearly-loved dog in the fight.
Others will monitor due to an interest in improvement of the election process. In the
latter case, it is preferable, where good-government or academic sponsorship is not
permitted, for the monitors to be associated with as neutral a candidate or organization
as possible.
Id.
215. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1304 (9th ed. 2009).
216. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980).
217. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
218. See supra Part II.B.1.a–b.
219. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581; see also Press Enter. Co. v. Superior
Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986).
220. See Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
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without their permission. 221 The Virginia statute also prohibits filming in a
manner that could potentially reveal anyone’s vote.222 Many of the poll watcher
statutes have similar safety mechanisms protecting voters.223 Such limitations
may be instructive, informing states how to properly limit the scope of the
media’s qualified right of access. Most importantly, the Supreme Court has
assured, if any limitation on access can pass strict scrutiny, a court can uphold
that limitation on this qualified right.224
III. CONCLUSION
The well-established dual-pronged test of “experience and logic” exists to
guide courts in determining whether a qualified First Amendment presumptive
right of access to government processes exists. Historically, there are a number
of instances throughout the United States in which “outsiders” other than
ordinary voters are permitted to enter the polling place. Logically, the interests
at stake in the polling place, particularly fairness and the public’s perception of
fairness, are analogous to those interests that provide for a constitutional
presumptive right of access to a myriad of governmental processes. As this is a
qualified right of access, proper limitations, if they pass strict scrutiny, may be
put in place. As such, experience and logic mandate attaching a qualified First
Amendment presumptive right of access for the public and the press to enter the
polling place.

221. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604(J) (2015); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 7-112
(West 2014) (limiting the time and specific observations reporters may make of particular voters at
the polls).
222. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604(J) (2015).
223. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-408(d) (2014) (prohibiting poll watchers from speaking
to voters, trying to influence voters, or otherwise interfering with the voting process and providing
for their removal if they do); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-45(c) (West 2014) (prohibiting poll
watchers from electioneering or interfering with the voting process).
224. See Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 9.
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